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Abstract
We introduce newmodal logical calculi that describe subtyping properties of Cartesian product and disjoint union type constructors
as well as mutually recursive types deﬁned using those type constructors.
Basic logic of subtyping S extends classical propositional logic by two new binary modalities ⊗ and ⊕. An interpretation of S
is a function that maps standard connectives into set-theoretical operations (intersection, union, and complement) and modalities
into Cartesian product and disjoint union type constructors. This allows S to capture many subtyping properties of the above type
constructors. We also consider logics S and S that incorporate into S mutually recursive types over arbitrary and well-founded
universes correspondingly.
The main results are completeness of the above three logics with respect to appropriate type universes. In addition, we prove Cut
elimination theorem for S and establish decidability of S and S .
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1. Introduction
1.1. Logical connectives as set operations
We are interested in the use of logical connectives to describe properties of set and type operations. Historically,
there have been two major ways to interpret logical connectives as such operations: set semantics and Curry–Howard
isomorphism.
According to the set semantics, every propositional formula is evaluated to a subset of a given universe U and
propositional connectives conjunction ∧, disjunction ∨, and negation ¬ are identiﬁed with set operations intersec-
tion ∩, union ∪, and complement U correspondingly. It is easy to see that a formula is provable in the classical
propositional logic if and only if it is evaluated to the entire universe U under any set semantics.
Under Curry–Howard isomorphism [8–10,13], propositional formulas are evaluated to types and connectives ∧,∨,
and → are interpreted as Cartesian product ×, disjoint union +, and constructive function 	→ type constructors. It could
be shown that a formula is provable in intuitionistic propositional logic (Int) if and only if it is evaluated to an inhabited
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type. Intuitionistic logic describes properties of Cartesian product, disjoint union, and function type constructors that
can be expressed in terms of type inhabitness.
Since the list of possible type constructors is not limited to product, disjoint union, and function, one can raise
a question about logical principles describing behavior of other type constructors. For example, list, partial object
[28], and squash [6] types can be viewed as modalities while inductive and co-inductive constructors [21,7] may be
considered as quasi-quantiﬁers. Kopylov and Nogin [16] established that modal logic of squash operator is, in fact,
Lax Logic [11]. If instead of types one considers languages then logical connectives corresponding to product and star
operations are described by Interval Temporal Logic [26].
1.2. Logic of subtyping
In this paperwe propose a logical systemS that describes subtyping properties ofCartesian product and disjoint union.
This system is an extension of the classical logic by two binary modalities ⊕ and ⊗, corresponding to Cartesian product
and disjoint union type constructors. LogicS is not the ﬁrst logical calculus aimed at axiomatization of subtyping.Meyer
[22] emphasizes that, developed with philosophical reasons in mind, Logic of Entailment [23,27], can be viewed as a
logic of subtyping.Mitchell [24] axiomatized subtyping relation for polymorphic types and proved completeness of this
axiomatization with respect to Girard’s [11] system F as well as its completeness with respect to a class of models. This
axiomatization only deals with → and ∀, the type constructors present in the system F. Mitchell’s subtyping relation is
proven in [31] to be undecidable. Longo et al. [18] proposed to treat subtyping predicate as a sequent  . The authors
designed a sequent calculus, which they called “logic of subtyping”, and proved its equivalence to Mitchell’s systems.
Later, in [19], they have started to call this approach “subtyping as entailment”. Natural deduction and Gentzen-style
calculi for this logic of subtyping is described in [30]. Valentini and Viale [33] investigated a similar logic of subtyping
that includes intersection types. They treat function type as a binary modality and prove completeness of their logic
with respect to applicative structures.
The main advantage of the system S is that it, unlike earlier calculi, treats subtyping as an operation, not a relation.
Thus, it allows nested occurrences of subtyping in formulas, making logic more expressive and showing closer connec-
tion between subtyping and implication. For example, the following S-tautology: 1 ⊗2 → (1 ⊗2 → 1 ⊗2),
under the deﬁned later semantics, states that any element of a two different Cartesian products also belongs to a “cross-
over” of these products. Among less trivial properties that can be expressed in S is the following property of Cartesian
product covers:
Proposition 1. Let I be a ﬁnite set T , S be two arbitrary sets, and {Ti}i∈I , {Si}i∈I be two families of sets then T ×S ⊆⋃
i∈I (Ti × Si) if and only if ∀J ⊆ I (T ⊆
⋃
i∈J Ti or S ⊆
⋃
i∈I\J Si).
It is formalized in S by the inference rule (xp), which will be deﬁned later. Remarkably, (xp) is the only rule of S
related to Cartesian product.
1.3. Recursive types
Recursive type is an arbitrary solution T of a ﬁxed point type equation T = f (T ). A family of mutually recursive
types is an arbitrary solution of a system of type equations {Ti = fi(T1, . . . , Tn)|i = 1, . . . , n}. Existence of such
types for monotone functions fi could be established using [29] ﬁxed point theorem for complete lattices or Banach
ﬁxed point theorem for contractive maps on complete metric spaces (see [20]). The case of non-monotone functions is
considered in [3]. Recursive types have been used to provide semantics for programming languages and a foundation
for automated theorem proving [25,14,5,7,21]. Most commonly, the least and the greatest solutions of the above type
equations are considered. They are known as inductive and co-inductive types. This paper studies subtyping logic of
arbitrary recursive types. Logics of inductive and co-inductive types would constitute extensions of the logic of arbitrary
recursive types.
Subtyping relation for recursive types was studied in Amadio and Cardelli [1], where a set of type rules and a subtype
checking algorithm for a simply typed -calculus is given. These results have been later extended in [17,2,15]. Ghelli
[12] has shown that subtyping algorithm for a second order system cannot be expanded to cover recursive types. Later, in
[4], Colazzo and Ghelli gave such algorithm for a system with bounded second order polymorphism. There are several
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points in which this paper is different from the previous works on subtyping of recursive types. First, we consider
recursive types built using type constructors corresponding to logical connectives ⊗, ⊕, and → of the deﬁned above
logic of subtyping S, not a function type constructor. Second, we deal with families of mutually recursively deﬁned
types. Finally, we do not introduce into the language of our logic S any new constructors that would represent recursive
types. Instead, we assume that propositional variables of our logic satisfy some system  of ﬁxed point equations. Thus,
instead of deﬁning one subtyping logic of mutually recursive types, we will specify a family S of such logics, where
 ranges over all possible systems of ﬁxed point equations. Of course, the last difference is just a matter of notation,
but it results in a more elegant presentation of the logic.
1.4. Type universe
Introduced in this paper logics of subtyping do not describe subtyping properties of any particular type system.
Instead, they describe common properties of rather general class of type universes. In other words, we are interested
in the subtyping tautologies that are true in all models of type systems. A universe is a set (of terms) with deﬁned on it
injections inl(x), inr(x), and pair(x, y). The only condition imposed on those functions is that inl(x) = inr(y) for any
two terms x and y. Any model of set theory with standard deﬁnitions of inl, inr, and pair satisﬁes this deﬁnition. So do
models of different type theories deﬁned as a set of syntactical terms (expressions) with an equivalence relation on it.
At the same time, some type theories, such as Nuprl [6], do not require their models to have a uniform equality relation.
Instead, each type has its own equality. Although, of course, one can deﬁne a uniform equality as the intersection of
all equalities, with respect to such uniform equality functions inl(x), inr(x), and pair(x, y) may not be injections. If
this is the case then such model is outside of the class of type universes considered in this paper.
Finally, by a type we will mean any subset of the universe. This allows the set of types to be closed under operations
of complement and union which is important given our interpretation of the connective →. Some type systems consider
a more narrow class of types. From the viewpoint of such a system, our results are still meaningful, because our extra
types could be viewed as just a tool for expressing properties of “legitimate” types.
1.5. Well-foundness
In addition to studying theminimal subtyping logic ofmutually recursive types that describes properties of all possible
type universes, we also consider logic of well-founded universes. We call a universe well-founded if any element in
this universe has a ﬁnite “structure”. Formal deﬁnition will be given later. Standard encoding of type operations into ZF
produces well-founded type universe. Another example of a well-founded type universe is the universe of expressions
built from atoms using operations pair, inl, and inr and syntactical equality of terms. On the other hand, any universe
that includes so-called “streams” is not well-founded.
We will show that logic S is complete not only with respect to the class of all universes, but also with respect to the
class of well-founded universes. At the same time, logic S has to be extended by an extra well-foundness rule to make
it complete with respect to well-founded universes.
2. Logics of subtyping
2.1. Syntax
By a modal propositional formula we mean any expression built from propositional variables p, q, r, . . . , using
binary connectives →, ⊗, ⊕ and 0-arity connective ⊥. As usual, , ¬,  ∨ , and  ∧  are considered to be
abbreviations for ⊥ → ⊥,  → ⊥, ¬ → , and ¬(¬ ∨ ¬) correspondingly. In addition, meta negation ¯ of a
modal propositional formula  is a syntactical operation that is deﬁned as following: if  ≡ ¬ for some propositional
formula then ¯ is, otherwise, ¯ is¬. Finally, a sequent is an arbitrary pair of ﬁnitemultisets ofmodal propositional
formulas. Sequent formed by multisets  and  is denoted by  ⇒ .
The syntax of subtyping logics, as deﬁned above, does not include any logical connectives corresponding to recursive
type constructors. Instead, recursive types are incorporated into the logic as a set of modal ﬁxed point equations
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{pi ≡ i}i∈I for some ﬁnite set I. Such set of equations will be called a recursion. Formal deﬁnition of recursion goes
as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. Recursion is an arbitrary function from propositional variables into modal propositional formulas.
Recursion  is ﬁnite if (p) = p for all but ﬁnitely many different propositional variables p.
Of course, not every system of ﬁxed point equations is consistent, or, in other words, has a type solution. For example,
this one: {p ≡ ¬p} is not. As it will follow from our completeness theorem, in order for such a solution to exist, it is
sufﬁcient for  to be positive in the following sense:
Deﬁnition 2. An occurrence of a propositional variable in a propositional formula is positive if either this occurrence
is within the scope of ⊕ or ⊗ connective or it is not within the scope of an ⊕ or an ⊗ connective, but is in the premises
of an even number of implications.
Recursion  will be called positive if for any propositional variable p, formula (p) has only positive occurrences
of propositional variables. Note that identity function id on propositional formulas is a ﬁnite positive recursion.
2.2. Semantics
Deﬁnition 3. A universe U is a quadruple 〈Term, pair, inl, inr〉, where Term is an arbitrary non-empty set, pair is an
injection that maps any two elements of set Term into an element of the same set, and inl and inr are two injections
from Term into Term. It is assumed that the last two functions also satisfy the following condition: ∀x, y ∈ Term (inl(x)
= inr(y)).
Elements of the set Term are called terms of the universe U. An arbitrary subset of Term will be called a type of the
universe U. In addition to standard set-theoretical operations on types, such as union, intersection, and complement,
we deﬁne operations Cartesian product S × T = {pair(s, t) | s ∈ S, t ∈ T } and disjoint union S + T = {inl(s) | s ∈
S} ∪ {inr(t) | t ∈ T }.
Deﬁnition 4. For any two terms t and s of a universe U, we say that s is a greatest subterm of t, written as t > s, if
t = inl(s), t = inr(s), t = pair(r, s), or t = pair(s, r)), for some term r. Let relation subterm  be the transitive
closure of the relation >.
Deﬁnition 5. A universe is called well-founded if any chain of its terms t1  t2  t3  · · · is ﬁnite. By rank(t1) we
mean the maximal length among all chains starting at t1.
Deﬁnition 6. Let U be a type universe. A valuation over U is an arbitrary function from propositional variables into
types of universe U.
Deﬁnition 7. For any propositional formula  and any valuation ∗ over a type universe U, we deﬁne type ∗ of the
universe U recursively as
(1) ⊥∗ = ∅, (4) (⊕ )∗ = ∗ + ∗,
(2) p∗ = ∗(p), (5) (⊗ )∗ = ∗ × ∗.
(3) ( → )∗ = (∗) ∪ ∗,
Let  be a recursion. We say that valuation ∗ is -sound if for any propositional variable p, ((p))∗ = p∗.
Deﬁnition 8. For any sequent  ⇒  and any recursion , let   ⇒  iff for any -sound valuation ∗ over an
arbitrary universe,
⋂
	∈ 	∗ ⊆
⋃

∈ 

∗
, where an intersection of an empty family of types is the entire universe U.
Let   ⇒  mean that the same is true for an arbitrary well-founded universe.
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2.3. Inference rules
Here we present subtyping logics as a Gentzen-style (sequential) calculus. Hilbert-style version of S is described
later.
Deﬁnition 9. For any recursion , logic of subtyping S is the extension of the classical sequential logic 1 by the
following four inference rules:
{i}i∈I ⇒ {j }j∈J {i}i∈I ⇒ {j }j∈J |I | > 0
{i ⊕ i}i∈I ⇒ {j ⊕ j }j∈J
(xu),
∀J ′ ⊆ J [{i}i∈I ⇒ {j }j∈J ′ or {i}i∈I ⇒ {j }j∈J\J ′ ] |I | > 0
{i ⊗ i}i∈I ⇒ {j ⊗ j }i∈J
(xp),
, p ⇒ 
, (p) ⇒  (lr),
 ⇒ , p
 ⇒ , (p) (rr).
If the (xu) rule is quite simple, the same hardly could be said about the (xp) rule. Each instance of this rule will have
as many hypotheses as there are subsets of the set J. In fact, this rule probably should be called rule schema because
for any conclusion of this rule there are 22|J | possible sets of hypotheses from which this conclusion could have been
deducted. This is because for every subset J ′ of J only one of statements {i}i∈I ⇒ {j }j∈J ′ and {i}i∈I ⇒ {j }j∈J\J ′
needs to be on the hypotheses list. The rule is a formalization in our language of Proposition 1.
Deﬁnition 10. For any recursion , subtyping logic of well-founded universes S is the extension of S by the
following inference rule:
 ⇒ ⊗ ,⊗ ,⊕ 
 ⇒ (wf).
Basic logic of subtyping S is the subtyping logic that does not include (lr) and (rr) rules. Alternatively, it can be
viewed as Sid , where id is the identity recursion. Similarly, S is deﬁned as Sid . Later in this paper (Corollary 2) we
will establish that S = S.
Theorem 1. For any sequent  ⇒  and any ﬁnite positive recursion ,
(1) S  ⇒  ⇐⇒   ⇒ ,
(2) S  ⇒  ⇐⇒ id  ⇒ ,
(3) S  ⇒  ⇐⇒   ⇒ .
Proof. Soundness. Induction on the size of the derivation. Soundness of rules of classical logic is trivial. Let us consider
non-classical rules.
(xp). Assume that the valuations of the rule premises are true. We will show that for any term t, if t ∈⋂i∈I (i ⊗i )∗
then there is j0 ∈ J such that t ∈ (j0 ⊗ j0)∗. If t ∈
⋂
i∈I (i ⊗ i )∗ then t ∈
⋂
i∈I (
∗
i × ∗i ). Since I is not empty,
t ≡ pair(t1, t2) for some terms t1 and t2 such that t1 ∈ ∗i and t2 ∈ ∗i for every i ∈ I . Thus, t1 ∈
⋂
i∈I 
∗
i and
t2 ∈ ⋂i∈I ∗i . Let J ′ = {j ∈ J | t2 ∈ ∗j }. The valuation of the (xp) rule assumptions implies that either⋂i∈I ∗i ⊆⋃
j∈J ′ 
∗
j or
⋂
i∈I ∗i ⊆
⋃
j∈J\J ′ ∗j . Let us consider those two cases separately:
(1) Statement t1 ∈ ⋂∈I ∗i implies t1 ∈ ⋃j∈J ′ ∗j . Thus, there is j0 ∈ J ′ such that t1 ∈ ∗j0 . At the same time,
by the deﬁnition of J ′, t2 ∈ ∗j0 . Hence, t = pair(t1, t2) ∈ ∗j0 × ∗j0 = j0 ⊗ ∗j0 .
(2) Since t2 ∈ ⋂i∈I ∗i , we have t2 ∈ ⋃j∈J\J ′ ∗j . Thus, there is j0 ∈ J\J ′ such that t2 ∈ ∗j0 . By the deﬁnition
of J ′, such j0 would have to belong to J ′. Contradiction.
(xu). Assume that the valuations of the rule premises are true. We will show that for any term t, if t ∈⋂i∈I (i ⊕i )∗
then there is j0 ∈ J such that t ∈ (j0 ⊕ j0)∗. First of all, t ∈
⋂
i∈I (i ⊕ i )∗ implies that t ∈ (i ⊕ i )∗ for every
1 See, for example, propositional fragment of system G1c in [32].
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i ∈ I . Since I is not empty, either t ≡ inl(u) or t ≡ inr(u) for some term u such that ∀i(u ∈ (i )∗) or ∀i(u ∈ (i )∗)
correspondingly. Let us consider the ﬁrst case. Hence, u ∈ ⋂i∈I ∗i . Valuation of the ﬁrst assumption of (xu) rule is⋂
i∈I 
∗
i ⊆
⋃
j∈J 
∗
j . Thus, u ∈
⋃
j∈J 
∗
j . Therefore, u ∈ ∗j0 for some j0 ∈ J . Finally, t ≡ inl(u) ∈ ∗j0 + ∗j0 =
(j0 ⊕ j0)∗. The second case is similar.
(lr). Since ∗ is a -sound valuation, ((p))∗ = (p)∗. Therefore,⋂	∈ 	∗ ∩ ((p))∗ ⊆ ⋃
∈ 
∗ ∪ p∗. Rule (rr)
can be handled similarly.
(wf). Assume that for some valuation ∗ and some modal propositional formulas ,, type ∗ is not empty and
∗ ⊆ (∗ × ∗) ∪ (∗ × ∗) ∪ (∗ + ∗). Let t0 be an element of ∗ of the lowest rank. The subtyping statement
above implies that t = pair(t1, t2) for some t1 ∈ ∗, t = pair(t1, t2) for some t2 ∈ ∗, t = inl(t1) for some t1 ∈ ∗,
or t = inr(t2) for some t2 ∈ ∗. Any of those statements contradicts to the minimality of rank of t among elements
of ∗. 
Completeness will be established later.
Lemma 1. S 1 ⊗ 2 ⇒ 1 ⊗ 2, ¯1 ⊗ 2,1 ⊗ ¯2, for any propositional formulas 1,2,1,2.
Proof. By (xp) rule, the above sequent is provable if the following eight statements are true: (1) S 1 ⇒ 1, ¯1,1
or S 2 ⇒, (2) S 1 ⇒ 1, ¯1 or S 2 ⇒ ¯2, (3) S 1 ⇒ 1,1 or S 2 ⇒ 2, (4) S 1 ⇒ 1 or
S 2 ⇒ 2, ¯2, (5) S 1 ⇒ ¯1,1 or S 2 ⇒ 2, (6) S 1 ⇒ ¯1 or S 2 ⇒ 2, ¯2, (7) S 1 ⇒ 1
or S 2 ⇒ 2,2, (8) S 1 ⇒ or S 2 ⇒ 2,2, ¯2. We are left to notice that, since S is an extension of
the classical propositional logic, in statements 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7 the left disjunct is true and in statements 4, 6, and 8 the
right disjunct is true. 
Lemma 2. S 1 ⊕ 2,¬(1 ⊕ 2) ⇒ ¯1 ⊕ ¯2, for any propositional formulas 1,2,1,2.
Proof. The following two sequents are provable in the classical fragment of S:1 ⇒ 1, ¯1 and2 ⇒ 2, ¯2. Thus,
by (xu) rule, S 1 ⊕2 ⇒ 1 ⊕2, ¯1 ⊕ ¯2. Therefore, by (li) rule, S 1 ⊕2,¬(1 ⊕2) ⇒ ¯1 ⊕ ¯2. 
3. Kripke semantics
In this section we prove completeness theorem for subtyping logics with respect to a class of Kripke models. Later
those Kripke models will be transformed into type universes to prove type completeness. Under this transformation,
worlds of a Kripke model will be mapped into terms of a universe. To prove completeness with respect to Kripke models
we ﬁrst deﬁne a more general notion of a Kripke structure and show that any Kripke structure contains an “embedded”
Kripke model. Second, we ﬁnish completeness proof by constructing a canonical Kripke structure.
3.1. Kripke structure
Deﬁnition 11. Kripke structure is an arbitrary four-tuple 〈W,R,L, ‖ · ‖〉, where W is a ﬁnite set of “worlds”, R is a
binary relation (“directed graph”) on W, L : R 	→ {1, 2, 1, 2} is a function that assigns labels to the edges of the
graph, ‖ · ‖ : W 	→ 2Var is a function that for every vertex of the graph speciﬁes a set of propositional variables. We
write wRv if (w, v) ∈ R and L(w, v) = .
Deﬁnition 12. Let W be the set of worlds of an arbitrary Kripke structure. We deﬁne subsets n, n, n, and  of W
as follows:
(1) 0 = ∅,
(2) n = {w | ∃u, v(wR1u ∧ wR2v) → ∃u, v ∈ n(wR1u ∧ wR2v)},
(3) n = {w | ∃u(wR1u ∨ wR2u) → ∃u ∈ n(wR1u ∨ wR2u)},
(4) n+1 = n ∪ (n ∩ n),
(5)  =⋃n n.
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Elements of set  will be referred to as well-founded worlds of the Kripke structure. The set of all worlds that are
not well-founded is denoted by . Informally, a world is well-founded if it can be decomposed into atomic worlds.
A Kripke structure is called well-founded if every world of this structure is well-founded.
Deﬁnition 13. Function h : W 	→ W ′ is a homomorphism between Kripke structures 〈W,R,L, ‖·‖〉 and 〈W ′, R′, L′,
‖ · ‖′〉 if for any world w and any label , wRu implies h(w)R′h(u) and, in addition, ‖h(w)‖′ = ‖w‖.
3.2. Kripke model
Deﬁnition 14. Kripke model is a Kripke structure 〈W,R,L, ‖ · ‖〉 that satisﬁes the following additional conditions:
(1) 〈W,R〉 is a, not necessary ﬁnite, DAG.
(2) Any two edges leaving the same vertex have different labels.
(3) Any vertex either has both 1- and 2- labeled outgoing edges or none of them.
(4) Any vertex cannot have both 1- and 2- outgoing edges.
Deﬁnition 15. Let w be a node of a Kripke model. By (w) we mean the unique node v such that wRv, if such
node exists.
Deﬁnition 16. For any node w of a Kripke model and an arbitrary propositional formula , relation w is deﬁned
by induction on complexity of formula :
(1) w⊥,
(2) wp if and only if p ∈ ‖w‖,
(3) w1 → 2 if and only if w1 or w2,
(4) w1 ⊗ 2 if and only if 1(w)1 and 2(w)2,
(5) w1 ⊕ 2 if and only if 1(w)1 or 2(w)2.
Deﬁnition 17. Kripke model is -sound if for any world w of this model and any propositional variable p, wp if
and only if w (p).
Deﬁnition 18. For any sequent  ⇒  and any recursion , let   ⇒ mean that for any world w of any -sound
Kripke model if w 	 for all 	 ∈  then w 
 for at least one 
 ∈ . In addition, let F  ⇒ mean that the same is
true for any ﬁnite Kripke model. 2
Theorem 2. For any sequent  ⇒  and any ﬁnite recursion ,
(1) S  ⇒  ⇐⇒   ⇒ ,
(2) S  ⇒  ⇐⇒ Fid  ⇒ ,
(3) S  ⇒  ⇐⇒ F  ⇒ .
Proof. Soundness (⇒) could be shown similarly to soundness part of Theorem1.Completeness (⇐)will be established
later. 
Corollary 1. For any ﬁnite recursion , logics S and S are decidable.
Corollary 2. For any sequent  ⇒ , S  ⇒  if and only if S  ⇒ .
3.3. Embedded models
Deﬁnition 19. Embedded model of a Kripke structure K is a pair 〈M,h〉, where M is a Kripke model and h is a
homomorphism of M into K.
2 Well-founded type universes will correspond to ﬁnite Kripke models.
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Deﬁnition 20. Let  = 〈M,h〉 be an embedded model of a Kripke structure K, where M = 〈W ′, R′, L′, ‖ · ‖′〉 and
K = 〈W,R,L, ‖ · ‖〉. A world w ∈ W ′ is -complete if
∃x, y ∈ W(h(w)R1x ∧ h(w)R2y) → ∃u, v ∈ W ′(wR′1u ∧ wR′2v)
the same world is -complete if
∃x ∈ W(h(w)R1x ∨ h(w)R2x) → ∃u ∈ W ′(wR′1u ∨ wR′2u).
The embedded model is complete if each world of this model is - and -complete.
Clearly any embedded tree can be made complete by expanding it (possibly inﬁnitely many times):
Lemma 3. For any world w of a Kripke structure K there is a complete embedded model 〈M,h〉 of K and a world v
of model M such that h(v) = w.
In some cases the embedded complete tree might be made ﬁnite. Below, n refers to the set deﬁned in Deﬁnition 12:
Lemma 4. For any well-founded world w ∈ n of a Kripke structure K there is a ﬁnite complete embedded model
〈M,h〉 of K and a world v of model M such that h(v) = w.
Proof. Induction on n. Base case is true because 0, by deﬁnition, is empty. Assume w ∈ n+1. Let kn be the
smallest k such that w ∈ k+1. Thus, w ∈ k and w ∈ k . Note that w ∈ k implies that either world w does not
have two -children or it has two -children w1 and w2 that belong to k . By the induction hypothesis, there are two
complete embedded models 〈M1, h1〉 and 〈M2, h2〉 and worlds v1 and v2 of those models such that h1(v1) = w1 and
h2(v2) = w2. Similarly, w ∈ k implies that if w has a i-child w3 then there is a complete embedded model 〈M2, h3〉
and a world v3 ofM3 such that h3(v3) = w3. We can combine those, at most three, complete embedded models into one
complete embedded model 〈M,h〉. Model M in addition to the worlds it inherits from models M1,M2,M3 also has a
new world v. Relations R are also inherited from models M1,M2,M3 with extra elements (v, v1), (v, v2), and (v, v3)
added to R1 ,R2 , and Ri correspondingly. Assume that values of ‖ · ‖ are also inherited from models M1,M2,M3
and that ‖v‖ = ‖w‖. Finally, let homomorphism h map v into w and is consistent with h1, h2, and h3 on the other
worlds. 
3.4. Canonical structure
Deﬁnition 21. A set of propositional formulas  is syntactically closed with respect to recursion  if
(1) For any propositional variable p such that (p) = p, both p and (p) belong to .
(2) If 1 → 2 ∈ , 1 ⊗ 2 ∈ , or 1 ⊕ 2 ∈  then 1 ∈  and 2 ∈ .
(3)  ∈  if and only if ¯ ∈  for any propositional formula .
(4) If 1 ⊗ 2 ∈  and 1 ⊗ 2 ∈  then ¯1 ⊗ 2 ∈  and 1 ⊗ ¯2 ∈ .
(5) If 1 ⊕ 2 ∈  then ¯1 ⊕ ¯2 ∈ .
Lemma 5. Any ﬁnite set of propositional formulas could be extended to a ﬁnite syntactically closed set of formulas.
In the rest of this section we will assume that  is an arbitrary recursion, is a ﬁnite syntactically closed with respect
to  set of propositional formulas, L is one of two logics: S or S . Let us deﬁne the canonical structure based on 
and L:
Deﬁnition 22. Let W be the set of all maximal L-consistent subsets of .
Deﬁnition 23. For any set w ∈ W we deﬁne the following four projections: pr1(w) = {1 | ∃2 (1 ⊗ 2 ∈ w)},
pr2(w) = {2 | ∃1 (1 ⊗ 2 ∈ w)}, pr1(w) = {1 | ∃2 (1 ⊕ 2 ∈ w)}, pr2(w) = {2 | ∃1 (1 ⊕ 2 ∈ w)}.
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Deﬁnition 24. For any two sets w, u ∈ W , any  ∈ {, }, and any index i ∈ {1, 2}, let wRi u be true if and only if
pri (w) = ∅ and pri (w) ⊆ u.
Deﬁnition 25. For any w ∈ W , let ‖w‖ = {p ∈ Var |p ∈ w}.
Lemma 6. 〈W,R,L, ‖ · ‖〉 is a Kripke structure.
The above deﬁned Kripke structure will be called canonical structure of logic L based on the syntactically closed
set of formulas .
3.5. Properties of canonical structure
Lemma 7. For any w ∈ W and any formula ⊗, if ⊗ ∈ w then there are u, v ∈ W such that wR1u and wR2 v.
Proof. Since any L-consistent set can be extended to a maximal L-consistent set, it is sufﬁcient to show that pr1(w)
and pr2(w) are consistent. Let us ﬁrst prove that pr

1(w) is consistent. Indeed, let 1 ⊗ 1, . . . ,n ⊗ n be the list
of formulas in w whose outermost operation is ⊗. This list is not empty because  ⊗  is on the list. Assume that
L 1, . . . ,n ⇒ and use the following instance of (xp) rule:
1, . . . ,n ⇒
1 ⊗ 1, . . . ,n ⊗ n ⇒
to conclude that w is not consistent. Contradiction. Similarly, one can show that pr2(w) is also consistent. 
Lemma 8. For any w ∈ W and any formula  ⊕ , if  ⊕  ∈ w then there is u ∈ W such that either wR1u
or wR2u.
Proof. Since any L-consistent set can be extended to a maximal L-consistent set, it is sufﬁcient to show that either
pr1(w) or pr

2(w) is consistent. Indeed, let1⊕1, . . . ,n⊕n be the list of formulas inw whose outermost operation
is ⊕. This list is not empty because  ⊕  is on the list. Assume that L 1, . . . ,n ⇒ and L 1, . . . ,n ⇒. By
(xu) rule, L 1 ⊕ 1, . . . ,n ⊕ n ⇒. Contradiction with the consistency of w. 
Lemma 9. For any 1 → 2 ∈  and any w ∈ W , 1 → 2 ∈ w if and only if either 1 /∈ w or 2 ∈ w.
Lemma 10. For any sets w, v, u ∈ W such that wR1u and wR2v and any formula 1 ⊗ 2 ∈ , 1 ⊗ 2 ∈ w if
and only if 1 ∈ u and 2 ∈ v.
Proof. (⇒): By Deﬁnition 23, 1 ⊗2 ∈ w implies that 1 ∈ pr1(w) and 2 ∈ pr2(w). At the same time, pr1(w) ⊆
u and pr2(w) ⊆ v. Thus, 1 ∈ u and 2 ∈ v. (⇐): Assumption wR1u implies that pr1(w) is not empty. Thus,
1 ⊗2 ∈ w for some formula1 ⊗2 in. Assume that1 ⊗2 /∈ w. By Deﬁnition 21, ¬(1 ⊗2) ∈ . Since w is
a maximal consistent subset of , formula ¬(1 ⊗2) should belong to w. By Lemma 1, L w ⇒ ¯1 ⊗2,1 ⊗ ¯2.
Since, by Deﬁnition 21, both ¯1 ⊗ 2 and 1 ⊗ ¯2 belong to , maximality of w implies that ¯1 ⊗ 2 ∈ w or
1 ⊗ ¯2 ∈ w. Thus, ¯1 ∈ pr1(w) ⊆ u or ¯2 ∈ pr2(w) ⊆ v. Consistency of u and v implies that 1 /∈ u or 2 /∈ v.

Lemma 11. For any i ∈ {1, 2} and any sets w, u ∈ W such that wRi u and any formula 1 ⊕ 2 ∈ , 1 ⊕ 2 ∈ w
if and only if i ∈ u.
Proof. Let us consider case i = 1, the other case is similar. (⇒): By Deﬁnition 23, 1 ⊕ 2 ∈ w implies that
1 ∈ pr1(w). At the same time, pr1(w) ⊆ u. Thus, 1 ∈ u. (⇐): Assumption wR1u implies that pr1(w) is not
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empty. Thus,1⊕2 ∈ w for some formula1⊕2 in. Assume that1⊕2 /∈ w. ByDeﬁnition 21,¬(1⊕2) ∈ .
Since w is a maximal consistent subset of, formula ¬(1 ⊕2) should belong to w. By Lemma 2, L w ⇒ ¯1 ⊕ ¯2.
By Deﬁnition 21, ¯1 ⊕ ¯2 belongs to . Thus ¯1 ∈ pr1(w) ⊆ u. Consistency of u implies that 1 /∈ u. 
Lemma 12. For any worldw of an embedded model 〈M,h〉 of the canonical Kripke structure and any formula  ∈ ,
w if and only if  ∈ h(w).
Proof. Induction on formula  complexity. Atomic case is trivial. If  is an implication, then the required follows
from Lemma 9. Let us consider the remaining cases.
Assume that  be a product 1 ⊗ 2. (⇒): w implies that w has -children 1(w), 2(w) and 1(w)1,
2(w)2.Hence, by the induction hypothesis,1 ∈ h(1(w)) and2 ∈ h(2(w)). ByLemma10, the last conjunction
implies 1 ⊗ 2 ∈ h(w). (⇐): By Lemma 7,  ∈ h(w) implies that h(w) has 1- and 2-children. Since w is -
complete under embedding h, it also has -children 1(w) and 2(w). Since h is a homomorphism, h(w)R1h(1(w))
and h(w)R2h(2(w)). Hence, by Lemma 10,  ∈ h(w) implies that 1 ∈ h(1(w)) and 2 ∈ h(2(w)). By the
induction hypothesis, 1(w)1 and 2(w)2. Therefore, w.
Suppose that  be a disjoint union 1 ⊕ 2. (⇒): w implies that either w has a 1-child and 1(w)1 or w
has a 2-child and 2(w)2. Let us consider the ﬁrst case. By the induction hypothesis, 1 ∈ h(1(w)). Thus, by
Lemma 11, 1 ⊕ 2 ∈ h(w). The second case is similar. (⇐): By Lemma 8,  ∈ h(w) implies that h(w) has either
1- or 2-child. Let us consider the ﬁrst case. Since w is -complete under embedding h, it also has 1-child 1(w).
Since h is a homomorphism, h(w)R1h(1(w)). Hence, by Lemma 11,  ∈ h(w) implies that 1 ∈ h(1(w)). By the
induction hypothesis, 1(w)1. Therefore, w. The second case is similar. 
Next, we will prove the completeness (⇐) part of Theorem 1.
3.6. Kripke completeness of logic S
Let S  ⇒ . Thus, X =  ∪ {¬	 | 	 ∈ } is S-consistent. By Lemma 5, set X can be extended to a ﬁnite
syntactically complete set. Consider canonical Kripke structure based on. Let u be a maximal S-consistent subset
of  containing X. By Lemma 3, there is node w of an embedded Kripke model 〈M,h〉 such that h(w) = v. By
Lemma 12, w for any  ∈ v. Thus, w for any  ∈ X.
Let us show that model M is -sound. Indeed, if (p) = p then, u (p) if and only if up for any u ∈ W . Assume
(p) = p. Hence, by Deﬁnition 21, both p and (p) belong to . Thus, by Lemma 12, it will be sufﬁcient to establish
that p ∈ u if and only if (p) ∈ u for any u ∈ W . (⇒): Suppose p ∈ u. By (rr) rule, S  u ⇒ (p). Since (p) ∈ 
and u is a maximal S-consistent subset of , formula (p) must belong to u. (⇐): If p /∈ u then, by maximality of u,
we have s  u, p ⇒. Hence, by (lr) rule, s  u, (p) ⇒. Since u is S-consistent, (p) /∈ u.
3.7. Kripke completeness of logic S
Deﬁnition 26. For any Kripke model K = 〈W,R,L, ‖ · ‖〉, any u ∈ W , and any n0, let Knu be a restriction of this
model to worlds from Wnu = {v | u = v0Rv1R . . . Rvk = v, 0kn}.
Lemma 13. For any world u of an arbitrary Kripke model K, any n0 and an arbitrary modal propositional formula
 that has no more than n instances of connectives, if  refers to forcing relation on model K and  ′ to the forcing
relation on model Knu then w if and only if w ′.
Proof. Induction on n. 
Back to the completeness proof. Suppose S ⇒ . Let n be the maximal number of connectives among formulas
in  and . Since S = Sid , completeness of S implies that there is a world u of a Kripke model W such that u 	 for
all 	 ∈  and u 
 for all 
 ∈ . Consider model Wnu . It is ﬁnite and, by Lemma 13, in this model u 	 for all 	 ∈ 
and u 
 for all 
 ∈ . Therefore, Fid  ⇒ .
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3.8. Kripke completeness of logic S
Proof of completeness for logic S is similar to the one for logic S, but instead of Lemma 3 one should use Lemma 4.
Thus, we only need to show that in the case of logic S , the canonical Kripke structure deﬁned above is well-founded.
Deﬁnition 27. For any ﬁnite set of propositional formulas v, by ∧v we mean conjunction of all formulas in v. For any
ﬁnite set V of ﬁnite sets of propositional formulas, by
∨
V we mean disjunction of ∧v for all v ∈ V .
Lemma 14. For any w ∈ W such that pr1(w) and pr2(w) are not empty,
S w ⇒ (∧(pr1(w))) ⊗ (∧(pr2(w))).
Proof. Let 1 ⊗ 1, . . . ,n ⊗ n be the list of all formulas in w whose outer-most operation is ⊗. We need to
establish that S w ⇒ (
∧
i i ) ⊗ (
∧
i i ). Indeed, the following two sequents are provable in classical logic:
1, . . . ,n ⇒
∧
i i and 1, . . . ,n ⇒
∧
i i . By combining them with (xp) rule, we get
S 1 ⊗ 1, . . . ,n ⊗ n ⇒
(∧
i
i
)
⊗
(∧
i
i
)
.
Finally, multiple applications of (lw) rule to the above sequent result in: S w ⇒ (
∧
i i ) ⊗ (
∧
i i ). 
Lemma 15. For any w ∈ W such that pr1(w) and pr2(w) are not empty,
S w ⇒ (∧(pr1(w))) ⊕ (∧(pr2(w))).
Proof. Similar to Lemma 14, but use (xu) rule instead of the (xp) rule. 
Lemma 16. For any X ⊆ , S  ∧ X ⇒
∨
X⊆u∈W (∧u).
Proof. Assume the opposite. Thus, set X ∪ {¬(∧u) |X ⊆ u ∈ W } is S -consistent. Let  be a maximal (inﬁnite)
S -consistent extension of this set. Since  is S -consistent,
∀u ∈ W(X ⊆ u ⇒ ∃ ∈ u(¬ ∈ )). (1)
Let u =  ∩ . Note that u is a maximal S -consistent subset of . Hence, u ∈ W . Since X is a subset of  and ,
we can claim that X ⊆ u. Thus, according to (1), there is  ∈ u such that ¬ ∈ . Since u ⊆ , set  contains both
 and ¬. Therefore,  is not S -consistent. Contradiction. 
Lemma 17. For any w /∈ 0, S w ⇒ (
∨
wR1u
(∧u)) ⊗ (∨wR2v (∧v)).
Proof. Note that sincew /∈ 0, sets pr1(w) and pr1(w) are not empty. Consider Lemma 16 for two cases:X = pr1(w)
and X = pr2(w):
S  ∧ (pr1(w)) ⇒
∨
wR1u
(∧u), S  ∧ (pr2(w)) ⇒
∨
wR2u
(∧u).
We can use (xp) rule to combine the last two statements into one:
S  (∧(pr1(w))) ⊗ (∧(pr2(w))) ⇒
( ∨
wR1u
(∧u)
)
⊗
( ∨
wR2u
(∧u)
)
.
The last statement, when combined with Lemma 14, implies that
S w ⇒
( ∨
wR1u
(∧u)
)
⊗
( ∨
wR2v
(∧v)
)
. 
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Lemma 18. S w ⇒ (
∨
wR1u
(∧u)) ⊕ (∨wR2v (∧v)), for any w /∈ 0.
Proof. Assumption w /∈ 0 implies that one of pr1(w), pr2(w) is not empty. Thus, there are  and  such that
 ⊕  ∈ w. Hence, both pr1(w) and pr2(w) are not empty. From here proceed as in Lemma 17, but use (xu) rule
instead of (xp) and Lemma 15 instead of Lemma 14. 
Lemma 19. S w ⇒ (
∨
) ⊗ (∨W), (∨W) ⊗ (∨), for any w /∈⋃i i .
Proof. By Deﬁnition 12, assumptionw /∈⋃i i implies either {u |wR1u} ⊆  or {u |wR2u} ⊆ . Let us start with
the ﬁrst case. Since {u |wR1u} ⊆ , the following sequent is trivially provable in the classical logic:
∨
wR1u
(∧u) ⇒∨
. Similarly, sequent
∨
wR1u
(∧u) ⇒ ∨W is provable in the classical logic because {u |wR2u} is a subset of
W. By applying (xp) rule to these two sequents, we get S  (
∨
wR1u
(∧u)) ⊗ (∨wR1u (∧u)) ⇒ (∨) ⊗ (∨W).
The last statement, when combined with Lemma 17 implies that S w ⇒ (
∨
) ⊗ (∨W). Finally, by (rw) rule,
S w ⇒ (
∨
) ⊗ (∨W), (∨W) ⊗ (∨). The case {u |wR2u} ⊆  is similar. 
Lemma 20. S w ⇒ (
∨
) ⊕ (∨), for any w /∈⋃i i .
Proof. By Deﬁnition 12, assumption w /∈ ⋃i i implies that {u |wR1u} ⊆  and {u |wR2u} ⊆ . Thus, the
following two sequents are provable in the classical logic:
∨
wR1u
(∧u) ⇒ ∨ and∨wR1u (∧u) ⇒ ∨. By (xu)
rule, S  (
∨
wR1u
(∧u)) ⊕ (∨wR1u (∧u)) ⇒ (∨) ⊕ (∨). The last statement, when combined with Lemma 18
implies that S w ⇒ (
∨
) ⊕ (∨). 
Lemma 21. Kripke structure K = 〈W,R,L, ‖ · ‖〉 is well-founded.
Proof. Since  = (⋃i i ) ∩ (⋃i i ), any element of  cannot belong to both: ⋃i i and ⋃i i . Thus, according
to Lemmas 19 and 20, for any w ∈  S w ⇒ (
∨
) ⊗ (∨W), (∨W) ⊗ (∨) or S w ⇒ (∨) ⊕ (∨).
Therefore, by (rw) rule, S w ⇒ (
∨
) ⊗ (∨W), (∨W) ⊗ (∨), (∨) ⊕ (∨), for any w ∈ . Hence,
S  ∧ w ⇒ (
∨
) ⊗ (∨W), (∨W) ⊗ (∨), (∨) ⊕ (∨), for any w ∈ . Thus, S  ∨ ⇒ (∨) ⊗
(
∨
W), (
∨
W)⊗ (∨), (∨)⊕ (∨). By (wf) rule, S  ∨ ⇒. This implies that S w ⇒ for all w ∈ . This
means that every element of  is inconsistent. Therefore,  is empty. 
This concludes Kripke completeness proof for logic S .
4. Term semantics
Deﬁnition 28. Let 〈W,R,L, ‖ · ‖〉 be an arbitrary Kripke model. We say that pair 〈w1, w2〉 of worlds in this model is
-grounded if there is a world v such that vR1w1 and vR

2w2.
Suppose two worlds w1 and w2 of some Kripke model 〈W,R,L, ‖ · ‖〉 are not grounded. They always can be made
grounded by an introduction of a new element w into set W and pairs 〈w,w1〉 and 〈w,w2〉 to relations R1 and R2
correspondingly. Value of ‖w‖ could be assigned arbitrarily. It is clear that such extension of a Kripke model does not
change relation u for any propositional formula  and any world u as long as u = w.
Lemma 22. For any positive recursion , if the above construction starts with a -sound Kripke model then value
‖w‖ could be deﬁned in such a way that the resulting Kripke model is also -sound.
Proof. Consider predicate transformer  : 2Var 	→ 2Var that is deﬁned as follows: for any X ⊆ Var deﬁne ‖w‖ to be
X. Let (X) = {p ∈ Var‖w (p). It is easy to see that because recursion  is positive, predicate transformer  is
monotonic. Thus, it has a ﬁxed point X0. If ‖w‖ is deﬁned to be X0 then the model is -sound. 
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Deﬁnition 29. Let 〈W,R,L, ‖ · ‖〉 be an arbitrary Kripke model. We say that world w in this model is -grounded if
there are worlds u and v such that uR1w and vR

2w.
Using an argument similar to the one above, it can be shown that any world of a -sound Kripke model can be made
-grounded by an introduction of at most two new worlds to the model. Such model modiﬁcation will preserve 
relation on existing worlds and, using predicate transformer technique from Lemma 22, the new Kripke model can be
made -sound.
Deﬁnition 30. A Kripke model is grounded if every world of this model is -grounded and -grounded at the
same time.
Lemma 23. For any positive recursion , every -sound Kripke model can be extended to a -sound grounded Kripke
model preserving  relation on the existing worlds.
Proof. Use described above construction to add new worlds to the model that will make all original worlds - and
-grounded. Repeat this process inﬁnitely many times to obtain an expanding chain of Kripke models. Every world
will be - and -grounded starting with some element of the chain. Take the union of the chain to be the ﬁnal Kripke
model. 
Deﬁnition 31. A Kripke model 〈W,R,L, ‖ · ‖〉 is well-founded if any chain w0Rw1R . . . RwnR . . . is ﬁnite.
Lemma 24. For any positive recursion , every ﬁnite -soundKripkemodel can be extended to a -soundwell-founded
grounded Kripke model preserving  relation on the existing worlds.
Proof. The algorithm described in the proof of Lemma 23, when applied to a ﬁnal Kripke model, produces a well-
founded model. 
Deﬁnition 32. For any grounded Kripke model K = 〈W,R,L, ‖ · ‖〉 the universe UK = 〈Term, pair, inl, inr〉 is
deﬁned as follows: Term = W , pair(v,w) is a world u of the grounded model K such that uR1v and uR2w, inl(v) is a
world u of the grounded model K such that uR1v, inr(v) is a world u of the grounded model K such that uR

2v.
Lemma 25. For any well-founded grounded Kripke model K, universe UK is also well-founded.
Deﬁnition 33. For any grounded Kripke model K, valuation ∗K over the universe UK is deﬁned as follows: p∗K =
{w |wp}.
Lemma 26. For any grounded Kripke model K = 〈W,R,L, ‖ · ‖〉, any w ∈ W , and any propositional formula ,
w if and only if w ∈ ∗K .
Proof. Induction on the structural complexity of . 
Corollary 3. For any -sound grounded Kripke model K, valuation ∗K is also -sound.
We are ﬁnally ready to ﬁnish proofs of Theorem 1. Suppose S  ⇒ . By Theorem 2, there is a Kripke model
〈W,R,L, ‖ · ‖〉 and a world w ∈ W such that w 	 for all 	 ∈  and w 
 for all 
 ∈ . By Lemma 23, this model
could be extended to a grounded well-founded Kripke model K. Consider universe UK . By Lemma 1, w ∈ 	∗K for all
	 ∈  and w /∈ 
∗K for all 
 ∈ . Hence,⋂∗K⋃∗K . Thus,   ⇒ .
Cases of logic S and S are similar to the one above, but use Lemma 24 instead of Lemma 23.
5. Cut elimination in S
In this section we will prove Cut elimination theorem for S following Cut elimination proof for classical logic
in [32].
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, p ⇒ , p(ax) ,⊥ ⇒ (lf)
 ⇒ , , ⇒ 
, →  ⇒  (li)
, ⇒ ,
 ⇒  → , (ri)
∀J ′ ⊆ J (I ⇒ J ′ or I ⇒ J\J ′)
, {i ⊗ i}i∈I ⇒ , {j ⊗ j }i∈J
(xp)
I ⇒ J I ⇒ J
, {i ⊕ i}i∈I ⇒ , {j ⊕ j }i∈J
(xu)
Fig. 1. Logic A. It is assumed that |I | > 0.
5.1. Absorption of structural rules
Deﬁnition 34. Cut-free logic of subtyping with absorbed structural rulesA is deﬁned by inference rules listed in Fig. 1.
We will refer to (xp) and (xu) rules as X-rules. A formula in the conclusion of an X-rule is called principal, if it
does not belong to  or . Principal formula of other inference rules is deﬁned as usual. Let A+ be the extension of A
by Cut rule and S− be Cut-free fragment of S.
Theorem 3. For any two multisets of propositional formulas  and , A+  ⇒  iff S  ⇒  and A  ⇒  iff
S−  ⇒ .
Let A d  mean that  has an A derivation of depth no more than d.
Lemma 27. For any d0 and any multisets of formulas , , ′, and ′, if A d  ⇒ , then A d ,′ ⇒ ,′.
Proof. Induction on d. Axioms and inference rules (ri) and (li) can be handled the same way as in the case of the
classical propositional logic. Suppose  ⇒  is deducted by (xu) rule. It means that  ≡ 0, {i ⊕ i}i∈I and
 ≡ 0, {j ⊕ j }j∈J for some multisets 0,0, {i ⊕ i}i∈I , {j ⊕ j }j∈J , such that |I | > 0, A d−1 I ⇒ J ,
and A d−1 I ⇒ J . Applying rule (xu), we get A d ,′ ⇒ ,′. (xp) rule can be handled similarly. 
The proof of the above lemma provides an algorithm to convert any derivation D of  ⇒  into a derivation of
,′ ⇒ ,′ of the same depth. We will denote the resulting derivation as D[′ ⇒ ′].
Corollary 4. Weakening rule  ⇒ 
,′ ⇒ ,′ (w) is admissible in A.
Lemma 28. For any d0 and any multisets of propositional formulas ,′,, and ′, if d
A+  ⇒ , then
d
A+ ,
′ ⇒ ,′.
Proof. Induction on the size of proof of  ⇒ . Similar to the proof of Lemma 27 with addition of one more case
corresponding to (c) rule. 
Lemma 29. For any propositional formula , A  ⇒ .
Proof. Induction on the size of . Cases of  being a propositional variable or an implication are identical to those for
the classical propositional logic.
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Assume that  ≡ ⊗. Since by the induction hypothesis Sid   ⇒  and Sid  ⇒ , we can use the following
instance of (xp) rule
 ⇒   ⇒ 
⊗  ⇒ ⊗  (2)
to conclude that A  ⊗ ⇒ ⊗. In formula (2), J is a single-element set. Thus, there are only two subsets of J: set
J itself and empty set ∅. The ﬁrst premise of (2) corresponds to subset J and the second premise corresponds to empty
subset.
Suppose  ≡ ⊕ . By the induction hypothesis A   ⇒  and A  ⇒ . We can apply (xu) rule to conclude
that A  ⊕  ⇒ ⊕ . 
Lemma 30. For any d0, any multisets of propositional formulas  and , and any propositional formulas  and ,
if A d , →  ⇒  then A d  ⇒ , and A d , ⇒ .
Proof. Induction on d. Axioms and inference rules (ri) and (li) can be handled the same way as in the case of the
classical propositional logic. Assume that , →  ⇒  is derived by (xu) rule. Thus, the last step of the derivation
has the following form:
I ⇒ J I ⇒ J
, → , {i ⊕ i}i∈I ⇒ , {j ⊕ j }j∈J
(xu).
One can use derivations of I ⇒ J and I ⇒ J and the same (xu) rule to derive in A sequents , {i ⊕ i}i∈I ⇒
,{j ⊕ j }j∈J and ,, {i ⊕ i}i∈I ⇒ , {j ⊕ j }j∈J . (xp) rule can be treated similarly. 
Lemma 31. For any d0, any multisets of propositional formulas  and , and any propositional formulas  and ,
if A d  ⇒  → , then A d , ⇒ ,.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 30. 
Lemma 32. A is closed under the following two contraction rules
, ,  ⇒ 
,  ⇒  (lc)
 ⇒ , ,
 ⇒ , (rc).
Proof. Induction on the depth d of the A derivation. Assume that , ,  ⇒  is an axiom. Then either there is a
propositional variable p such that p ∈ ( ∪ {}) ∩  or ⊥ ∈ ( ∪ {}). In either of those cases ,  ⇒  is also an
axiom. Rule (rc) can be handled similarly.
Suppose that , ,  ⇒  is derived by (li) rule. If  is the principal formula in this rule then  ≡ 1 → 2 for some
propositional formulas 1 and 2, A d−1 , 1 → 2 ⇒ 1, and A d−1 , 1 → 2, 2 ⇒ . By Lemma 30, we
can conclude that A d−1  ⇒ 1, 1, and A d−1 , 2, 2 ⇒ . Thus, by the induction hypothesis, A  ⇒ 1,
and A , 2 ⇒ . Finally, by (li) rule, we get A , 1 → 2 ⇒ . If not , but some other formula  →  is the
principal formula of (li) rule, then A d−1 , ,  ⇒ , and A d−1 , , ,  ⇒ . By the induction hypothesis,
A ,  ⇒ , and A , ,  ⇒ . Hence, by (li) rule, we can conclude that A , ,  →  ⇒ . Inference rule
(ri) as well as the other contraction rule could be handled similarly.
Suppose that , ,  ⇒  is derived by (xu) rule. If at least one of two s is not principal in this rule then the
same rule could be used to derive the sequent without this instance of . Assume that both s are principal. Hence,
 ≡ 1 ⊕ 2 for some formulas 1 and 2 and the instance of (xu) rule has the following form:
1, 1,I ⇒ J 2, 2, I ⇒ J
0, 1 ⊕ 2, 1 ⊕ 2, {i ⊕ i}i∈I ⇒ 0, {j ⊕ j }j∈J
(xu).
By the induction hypothesis,A  1,I ⇒ J andA  2, I ⇒ J . Applying (xu) rule, we getA 0, 1 ⊕2, {i ⊕
i}i∈I ⇒ 0, {j ⊕ j }j∈J . The other contraction rule could be handled similarly.
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If , ,  ⇒  is derived by (xp) rule then we can show that ,  ⇒  using the same argument as in the previous
case. Assume that  ⇒ , , is derived by (xp) rule. We will show that A  ⇒ ,. Indeed, if at least one of two
s is not principal in (xp) rule then the same rule could be used to derive the sequent without this instance of . If both
s are principal then  ≡ 1 ⊕ 2 for some formulas 1 and 2, the conclusion of (xp) rule has the following form:
0, {i ⊗ i}i∈I ⇒ 0, {j ⊗ j }j∈J , 1 ⊗ 2, 1 ⊗ 2
and multiple premises of that rule could be arranged into the following three groups:
(1) ∀J ′ ⊆ J (I ⇒ J ′ or I ⇒ I\J ′ , 2, 2),
(2) ∀J ′ ⊆ J (I ⇒ J ′ , 1 or I ⇒ I\J ′ , 2),
(3) ∀J ′ ⊆ J (I ⇒ J ′ , 1, 1 or I ⇒ I\J ′).
By the induction hypothesis, from the ﬁrst and the third of the above statements we can conclude that
∀J ′ ⊆ J (A I ⇒ J ′ or A  I ⇒ I\J ′ , 2),
∀J ′ ⊆ J (A I ⇒ J ′ , 1 or A  I ⇒ I\J ′).
Therefore, by (xp) rule, A 0, {i ⊗ i}i∈I ⇒ 0, {j ⊗ j }j∈J , 1 ⊗ 2. 
5.2. Cut elimination algorithm
Theorem 4. For any two multisets of modal propositional formulas  and ,
A+  ⇒  ⇒ A  ⇒ .
Proof. Consider any instance of the Cut rule in the derivation
D1
 ⇒ ,  (r1)
D2
, ⇒  (r2)
 ⇒  (c). (3)
Let d be the depth of the derivation and s be the size of . We will show by induction on 〈s, d〉 that if the left and the
right subtrees of derivation (3) are Cut-free then A  ⇒ . Just like in the classical logic case, there are three major
cases to consider:
(A) at least one of (r1) and (r2) is an axiom instance;
(B) (r1) and (r2) are not axioms and at least in one of the premises  is not principal;
(C) (r1) and (r2) are not axioms and  is principal in both premises.
Case A. Suppose that  ⇒ ,  is an axiom. Then either (i) ⊥ ∈ , or (ii)  ∩  contains a propositional variable,
or (iii)  is a propositional variable and  ∈ . In the ﬁrst two cases  ⇒  is also an axiom. In the third case, we can
apply (lc) rule (see Lemma 32) to sequent , ⇒  to conclude that A  ⇒ .
Case B. Although  could be principal in (r1) or (r2), we only will consider here the ﬁrst of those subcases. Proof
for the other one is similar. The ﬁrst subcase will be split further based on what kind of rule (r1) turns out to be.
Let (r1) be (li) rule. Then derivation (3) takes the form
D11
′ ⇒ , 	1, 
D12
′, 	2 ⇒ , 
 ⇒ ,  (li)
D2
, ⇒  (r2)
 ⇒  (c) (4)
for some multiset of formulas ′ and propositional formulas 	1 and 	2 such that  ≡ ′ ∪ {	1 → 	2}. Derivation (4)
can be transformed into the following derivation:
D11[	1 → 	2 ⇒]
 ⇒ , 	1, 
D2[⇒ 	1]
, ⇒ , 	1
 ⇒ , 	1
D12[	1 → 	2 ⇒]
, 	2 ⇒ , 
D2[	2 ⇒]
,, 	2 ⇒ 
, 	2 ⇒ 
, 	1 → 	2 ⇒ 
. (5)
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Although this derivation has two instances of the Cut rule, by Lemma 27 both of them are applied to trees of lower depth
than the trees towhich theCut rule is applied in derivation (4). Hence, by the induction hypothesis,A , 	1 → 	2 ⇒ .
By Lemma 32, A  ⇒ .
Next, assume that (r1)=(xu) and  is not a principal formula of this rule. Then derivation (3) can be replaced by the
Cut-free derivation
D1
 ⇒  (xp). Similar argument can be made in the case when (r1)=(xp).
Case C. We will consider the following three subcases:  ≡ 1 → 2,  ≡ 1 ⊗ 2, and  ≡ 1 ⊕ 2 for some
formulas 1 and 2.
If  ≡ 1 → 2 is principal formula in both (r1) and (r2) then (r1)=(ri) and (r2)=(li). Hence, derivation (3) has
the form
D11
, 1 ⇒ , 2
 ⇒ , 1 → 2 (ri)
D21
 ⇒ , 1
D22
, 2 ⇒ 
1 → 2, ⇒  (li)
 ⇒  (c) (6)
that can be re-arranged into a derivation in which both Cut rule applications have smaller rank:
D21
 ⇒ , 1
D11
, 1 ⇒ , 2
D22[1 ⇒]
, 1, 2 ⇒ 
, 1 ⇒  (c)
 ⇒  (c).
Assume that  ≡ 1 ⊕ 2. Since  is the principal formula in (r1) and (r2), each of these rules is (xu). Thus, the left
subtree of derivation (3) has the form
D11
I1 ⇒ J1 , 1
D12
I1 ⇒ J1 , 2
1, {i ⊕ i}i∈I1 ⇒ 1, {j ⊕ j }j∈J1 , 1 ⊕ 2
(xu), (7)
and the right subtree of the same derivation has the form
D21
1,I2 ⇒ J2
D22
2, I2 ,⇒ J2
2, 1 ⊕ 2, {i ⊕ i}i∈I2 ,⇒ 2, {j ⊕ j }j∈J2
(xu), (8)
where  ≡ 1, {i ⊕ i}i∈I1 ≡ 2, {i ⊕ i}i∈I2 and  ≡ 1, {j ⊕ j }j∈J1 ≡ 2, {j ⊕ j }j∈J2 . Derivations (7)
and (8) could be re-arranged into the following two derivations:
D11[I2 ⇒ J2 ]
I1 ,I2 ⇒ J1 ,J2 , 1
D21[I1 ⇒ J1 ]
1,I1 ,I2 ⇒ J1 ,J2
I1 ,I2 ⇒ J1 ,J2
(c),
D12[I2 ⇒ J2 ]
I1 , I2 ⇒ J1 , J2 , 2
D22[I1 ⇒ J1 ]
2, I1 , I2 ⇒ J1 , J2
I1 , I2 ⇒ J1 , J2
(c).
Since those two derivations have cutformulas of smaller size than the original derivation, we can use induction hy-
pothesis to conclude that A I1 ,I2 ⇒ J1 ,J2 and A  I1 , I2 ⇒ J1 , J2 . Hence, by (xu) rule, A 1,2, {i ⊕
i}i∈I1 , {i ⊕ i}i∈I2 ⇒ 1,2, {j ⊕ j }j∈J1 , {j ⊕ j }j∈J2 . In other words, , ,. Therefore, by Lemma 32,
A  ⇒ .
Assume  ≡ 1 ⊗ 2. Since  is the principal formula in rules (r1) and (r2), each of them is (xp). Also, the premises
of the rule (r1) could be combined into the following two groups:
∀J ′1 ⊆ J1(A I1 ⇒ J ′1 or A  I1 ⇒ J1\J ′1 , 2), (9)
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∀J ′1 ⊆ J1(A I1 ⇒ J ′1 , 1 or A  I1 ⇒ J1\J ′1), (10)
and premises of rule (r2) are
∀J ′2 ⊆ J2(A  1,I2 ⇒ J ′2 or A  2, I2 ⇒ J2\J ′2), (11)
where  ≡ 1, {i ⊗ i}i∈I1 ≡ 2, {i ⊗ i}i∈I2 and  ≡ 1, {j ⊗ j }j∈J1 ≡ 2, {j ⊗ j }j∈J2 . We need to show
that A  ⇒ . By Lemma 32, it is sufﬁcient to show that A , ⇒ ,. Furthermore, according to the (xp) rule,
this would follow from provability in A of the following group of sequents:
∀J ′1 ⊆ J1,∀J ′2 ⊆ J2(I1 ,I2 ⇒ J ′1 ,J ′2 or I1 , I2 ⇒ J1\J ′1 , J2\J ′2).
We will show, by contradiction, that the above sequents are provable in A. Indeed, let for some J ′1 ⊆ J1 and J ′2 ⊆ J2:
AI1 ,I2 ⇒ J ′1 ,J ′2 , AI1 , I2 ⇒ J1\J ′1 , J2\J ′2 . (12)
Hence, by Lemma 27, AI1 ⇒ J ′1 and AI1 ⇒ J1\J ′1 . Combining the last statement with (9) and (10) we can
conclude that A  I1 ⇒ J1\J ′1 , 2 and A I1 ⇒ J ′1 , 1. Thus, by Lemma 27,
A  I1 , I2 ⇒ J1\J ′1 , J2\J ′2 , 2, A I1 ,I2 ⇒ J ′1 ,J ′2 , 1. (13)
However, by the sameLemma27,wecan conclude from(11) that eitherA  1,I1 ,I2 ⇒ J ′1 ,J ′2 orA  2, I1 , I2 ⇒
J1\J ′1 , J2\J ′2 . Hence, taking into account (13),we can say that either sequentI1 ,I2 ⇒ J ′1 ,J ′2 or sequent I1 , I2 ⇒
J1\J ′1 , J2\J ′2 is provable in A
+ with just a single use of the cut rule. In the case of the ﬁrst sequent, the cutformula is 1
and in the case of the second sequent the cutformula is 2, either of them has a smaller size than 1 ⊗ 2. Thus, by the
induction hypothesis, either A I1 ,I2 ⇒ J ′1 ,J ′2 or A  I1 , I2 ⇒ J1\J ′1 , J2\J ′2 . Contradiction with (12). 
6. Hilbert axiomatics
Deﬁnition 35. Hilbert version HS of basic subtyping logic is the minimal, closed under Modus Ponens, extension of
classical propositional logic by the following axioms and inference rules for Cartesian product and disjoint union:
(1) ⊥ ⊗  → ⊥, ⊗ ⊥ → ⊥, ⊥ ⊕ ⊥ → ⊥,
(2) ( → ) ⊗ ( → ) → (⊗  → ⊗ ),
(3) ( → ) ⊕ ( → ) → (⊕  → ⊕ ),
(4) ⊗  → [(⊗  → ⊗ ) → ( → ) ⊗ ],
(5) ⊗  → [(⊗  → ⊗ ) → ⊗ ( → )],
(6) ⊕  → [(⊕  → ⊕ ) → ( → ) ⊕ ( → )],
(7)  → ,  →  ⊗  → ⊗ ,
(8)  → ,  →  ⊕  → ⊕ .
Theorem 5. For any two multisets of modal propositional formulas  and , S  ⇒  if and only if HS ∧
 →∨.
7. Conclusions
We have developed a sequential logical calculus S that describes subtyping properties of mutually recursive types
built using Cartesian product and disjoint union. From logical prospective, this calculus is an extension of the classical
propositional logic by just two new binary modalities: ⊗ and ⊕. We have proved its completeness with respect to
all algebras of terms. In case when the set of ﬁxed point equations is empty, this calculus becomes basic logic of
subtyping S. We proved Cut elimination theorem and gave Hilbert-style axiomatic for S. We also investigated the case
of well-founded universes. It turns out that in this case the basic logic of subtyping (without recursive types) stays the
same, but subtyping logic of recursive types needs an extra well-foundness inference rule for completeness. Subtyping
logic of mutually recursive types over well-founded universe S is proven to be decidable. The same question about
logic S of all mutually recursive types remains open.
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The most logical next step in this work is the description of subtyping logics of inductive and co-inductive types.
Those are logics describing subtyping properties of the least and the greatest solutions of the appropriate system of type
equations. Another direction of the future research is the extension of subtyping logic S by modalities corresponding
to the other type constructors: constructive and non-constructive function, quotient, dependent product, etc.
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